In most mammals, and in the majority of traditional human societies for which data exist, status, power, or resource control correlates with lifetime reproductive success; male and female patterns differ. Because such correlations are often argued to have disappeared in human societies durmg the demographic transitton of the nineteenth century, we analyzed wealth and lifetime reproductive success in a nineteenth-century Swedish population in four economically diverse partshes, subsuming geographic and temporal variation. Chddren of both sexes born to poorer parents were more likely than rtcher children to die or emtgrate before reaching maturity. Poorer men, and women whose fathers were poorer, were less likely to marry in the parish than others, largely as a result of differential mortahty and migration. Of all adults of both sexes who remained in their home parish and thus generated complete hfettme records, richer mdividuals had greater lifetime fertility and more children alive at age ten, than others. The age-specdic fertility of richer women rises slightly sooner, and reaches a hrgher peak, than that of poorer women. These patterns persisted throughout the period of the sample (1824-1896). Thus, wealth appears, even during the demographic transition in an egalitarian society, to have influenced lifetime reproducttve success positively.
INTRODUCTION

A
the hfe patterns of people m l9th-century Sweden a populatlon for which excellent records exist through the hlstorlc demographlc transItIon from large to small family sizes We examine longltudlnal hfetlme data from mdlvlduals
In four Swedish panshes, seeklng correlates of reproductlve success Our behavior ecologlcal approach beglns with the argument that behavlors which become common and remain 50 are those that produce reproductive profit for their performers Even for nonhuman species. because the world IS often far more complex than one might at first Imagine, maxlmum fertlhty 15 not always optimum In fact, "Most successful reproduction" does not necessarily mean producmg the most offsprmg, or even the most survlvmg offsprlng (e g , Lack 1947 . 1966 . Dawkms 1982 , 1986 , 1989 , WIIhams 1966 . Daly and Wilson 1983 The existence of a large "zero success" reproductive group contrlbutes enormously to the variance (cf Falconer 19811, far more than the ptoductlon of, for example, eight versus SIX offspring No species produces offsprlng at Its maxlmum physlologlcally defined rate, reproductive success depends not only on productlon, but also on the Investment requu-ed to produce viable, competitive, reproductive offspring Thus producing fewer, better-Invested offsprmg, compared to the maximum physlologlcally possible, can be, depending on envu-onmental condltlons, reproductively more efflclent Costs and benefits may differ for male and female parents (e g . see Daly and Wilson 1983, Krebs and Davies 1991) This reiterates and extends the "quantity-versus-quahty" dilemma first raised by Darwm (187 I ) If there IS a behavloral ecology of fertlhty, many patterns of startmg, stoppmg, and spacing children are possible adaptive responses to envlron-mental condltlons that vary among socletles and across time, rather than non-optimum-because-not-maxrmum patterns (see review by Low et al 1992) . BehavIoral ecologlcal approaches are really cost-benefit approaches that use reproductive as well as economic currencies. Both purely economic and Darwmlan views of fertlhty recogmze that social and economic success are Important goals affectmg reproductive declslons. But those who do not specify such goals as proximate goals (that have over evolutionary time correlated with enhanced reproductive success) make quite different predictions from Darwmians: for example, that It IS most rational to produce maximal number of chddren m tradltlonal societies (e g , Handwerker 1986) An evolutionary approach argues that fertility schedules should respond to ecological condltlons (e g , Turke 1989 , 1990 , Blurton Jones 1986 , 1987 , 1989 , and that better-versus worse-off famlhes should respond differently
In premdustrlal human societies, resources and net hfetlme reproductive success are correlated (HIII 1984 , Chagnon 1988 , Betzlg 1986 Boone 1986; Hughes 1986 , 1988 , Fhnn and Low 1986 , Voland 1990 , Voland and Engel 1990 , Low 1989 , 1990a ,b, 1991 Human patterns, though, can vary greatly, and show many historical particulars There seems to be a stronger assoclatlon between status or resource control and reproduction among tradltlonal socletles than among modern, post-transltlon socletles, thus data from the demographic transItIon are Important
Hypothesis and Predictions: What Influences Individual Reproductive Lives?
Here, then, we will ask, m the most synthetic manner, about hfetlme reproduction and wealth, about the survlvorshlp and fertlhty of richer versus poorer mdlvlduals m a society entermg the demographlc transiton Did the survIvorshIp of children of richer versus poorer parents differ? Were these children more or less likely to leave the parish as children? As adults, were richer versus poorer mdlvlduals more hkely to leave the parish? As adults, If they stayed, were they more or less hkely to marry') Did the age-speclflc fertlhty of richer versus poorer women differ? Available resource levels should Influence fertlhty, mortahty, and mlgratlon m specltic ways Abundant resources should be associated with high fertlhty and low out-mlgratlon from the region, reduction m resources should be accompanied by lowered fertlhty and greater out-mlgratlon
The hypothesis that resources contrlbute to enhanced survIvorshIp and reproduction generates the followmg predlctlons (Low 1989 , 1990a . Low and Clarke 1991 From 1686 to 1810, the nobdlty practiced "fldelcommlss." or male pnmogemture, with the constraint that the eldest son must continue the practice (Maimstrom 1981 (Maimstrom . lnger 1980 Untd 1845, sons mherlted twice as much as daughters, after that date, daughters had equal lnherltance rights, although m practice sons had first choice of the land and goods which were to be their Inheritance, and sons could purchase their sisters' lnherltance from them (Lo-Johansson 1981 , Inger 1980 Thor meant that disputes occaslonally arose over the value of the exchanged mherltance Items. purchasmg needed land from a slblmg could prove economlcally onerous. but also qlbhngs sometimes complamed that they did not receive fair value (not uncommon elsewhere m Europe, see Habakkuk 1955) Even after the $htft from fIdelcornmiss, and even after estabhshment of legally equal Inheritance rules for both sons and daughters, mherltance biased by birth order was often evident (5ee Gaunt 1987 . Low 1989 , 1990a . and a bias toward the first son was perhaps more evident m the northern areas Legal agreements m which a father ceded hrs land to one (usually the eldest) of his sons before his death. typlcally m return for room, food, and certain other right\, were common But as Gaunt (1987) Interestmgly, landowners' famlhes not only were larger, but showed less variance (Low and Clarke m press) than those of non-landowners.
Nedertorned.
Nedertorneb, the most northern parish, was a farming parish, land was generally of poor quahty Throughout the first half of the mneteenth century, the Fmmsh hablt of feeding Infants on cow's mdk rather than nursmg was common (Brandstrom 1984) Sundm (1976) . analyzing theft and poverty In Sweden, found that fammes and high food prices were good predictors of theft m the counties relymg on one prmclpal agricultural crop However. In "mlxed" counties (e g , Kalmar, which Includes Locknevl Pansh), the correlation was weaker
In the northern "forest" counties (e g , Vasternorrland, which Includes Tuna Pansh), forestry and n-onworks as well as huntmg and fishmg supplemented agriculture. yleldmg a dlverslfied economy In these countle\, Sundm found no slgmticant relatlonshlp among crop yields, cost-of-hvmg mdlces, and theft rates All of these differences dre Important, particularly In the examlnatlon of hIstorIcal and parish-speclflc patterns To explore the effects of wealth on llneage success m this society most broadly, we here examme patterns In the moct general context
Because we want to ask about better-versus-worse strategies. rn term\ of hfetlme reproductive success relative to the reproductive competitors present at the time in each parish, we need to subsume temporal and spatial differences wlthout lgnormg them Our methods are described In detail elsewhere (Low and Clarke 1991, Low 1991, Clarke and Low m press) Here we WIII sum-marlze pertment mformatlon only brlefly As m our earher analyses, we wdl define wealth by father's wealth for children and by own status for adult men and father's or husband's status for adult women Because women seldom If ever exceeded their father's wealth In this society, unless they married hypergynously (I e , "up"), we used father's wealth for unmarried and husband's wealth for married women Reproductive patterns varied m time and among parishes (Lockridge 1983, Low and Clarke 1991, Low et al 1992, see also Rgskaft et al this volume): to make general statements for all of the panshes. we must take that mto account In one parish (Tuna) we had land ownership information (Low 1990a), m others we had only occupatlonal information (Low 1989 , Low and Clarke 1991 , Low et al 1992 To make broad comparisons possible without lgnormg this variation among parishes and through time, we compare each mdlvldual's wealth as "richer" (owned land and/or had occupatlonal status of upper-mlddle class, lower-middle class, or bonder StatIstIcal analyses compare the entire sample, stratlfymg by richer-versus-poorer, thus reproductive measures are compared for richer versus poorer Indlvlduals, with comparisons stratIfled by parish and decade
We integrate these data mto a picture of hfe prospects for people born m different condltlons, and we relate these patterns to the general problem of resources, family declslons, and demographlc transItIons In this way we hope to take regional differences and hlstorlcal particulars Into account. but not to be distracted by them m this analysis
PATTERN IN LIFETIMES
These predlctlons are as general as we can make them If the correlation between wealth and reproductive success holds even In a society as monogamous and egahtarlan as 19th-century Sweden, and even during the demographic transItIon there, we consider It powerful evidence of the strength of the relatlonshlp Let us examme, then, the lifetime patterns of mdlvlduals as they are Influenced by wealth and resource control
Wealth and Survival
Because male and female mammals typlcally show very drfferent survlvorship curves, and this sample from Sweden has proved no exception (Low et al 1991 , Low 1991 
Wealth and Lifetime Fertility
Of all men who remained m the parish of their birth, richer men had more children (NBC. n = 1043, d f = 2, X2 = IO 84, p = 0 004), and margmally more chddren alive at age ten (RS ,(, n = 1043, d f = 2. X2 = 4 26. p = 0 118) than poorer men (PredIctIon 5) Slmllarly, of all women who stayed their whole lives m the parish of their bu-th, richer women had more children (NBC n = 594, d f = 2, X2 = I3 49, p = 0 001). and more children ahve at age ten (RSIO n = 594, d f = 2, X' = IO 08, p = 0 0071, compared to the medians for all adults reachmg maturity m the same decade m the same parish
In our by-pansh analyses, m which we did not compute the median reproductive patterns by decade. we observed these differences for men, but were unable to see them for women, because of remarriage patterns, sample size, and within-parish (e g , temporal) vanatlon, which swamped the differences (Low 1989 (Low , 1990a . Low and Clarke 1991 m press) Here we find the Impact of wealth on fertlhty IS also reflected by the age-specific fertlhty of richer versus poorer women richer women's fertlhty rises faster and remams higher than poorer women's fertlllty throughout their reproductlve hves (PredIctIon 6, Fig 2) Note that the sample m Figure 2 IS not women whose entn-e reproductive hves are under observation The Impact of resources IS less when one compares only married m- 
Wealth and Life Patterns
Wealth, vlewed simply as "ncher" versu\ "poorer." thu\ Influence\ the hfe patterns of both males and female\ (Fig 3) Above. we have dl\cus\ed mdlvlduals as "ncher" or "poorer," "marned" or "never mdrrled." without dlscussmg how likely they were to reach any particular status Some of the statlrtlcal tests we used above do not reflect the fact that one'\ probablhtles (e g , of marrymg) may change throughout hfe the probabdlty of marrymg for a daughter born to a poor father I\ different dt birth, If she survives and remam\ In the parish to age IS, and If she remams m the parish after age I5 Figure 3 hIghlights m bold lines the llkehest paths followed by sons and daughters of rich and poor men to greater (above-to-median marital fertlhty) or lesser (below-medldn fertility for all adults) reproduction Here, our goal IS to empha\lze that wlthm existing varlatlon there were still dominant patterns Females (Fig 3d, b) Daughters of poor fdthers were dbout 10%' more likely to die or migrate from their parish of birth before the age of I5 than were daughters of rich men Women were also more likely to leave as adult\ If born to poor fathers Overall, daughters of richer men were more likely to remam In the parish and marry (above), however, of the women who stayed m their parish of birth to reproductive age, daughter\ of both rich and poor men were equally likely to marry (Fig 3a. b) The hkely remalmng life-paths for married women and unmarried women differed. dependmg on whether they were born to poor or rich fathers Of women who married, virtually all women (98%) born to poor father, mdrrled men who were poor, while 77% of women born to rich fathers mart-led rich men Married women's fertility was compared to that of other women m the same parish of birth A. Females born to poorer fathers .I FIGURE 3. Some paths (heavy lines) were more hkely than others for mdlvlduals born to richer or poorer fathers Reproductive comparisons are relattve to all adults who reached age 23 m the same decade m the same parish for non-married mdlvrduals, and relative to all mdlvlduals marrying m the same parish during the same decade for married mdlvlduals Strong wlthm-sex dtfferences are hlghhghted by asterlsks Extrmslc factors (mdlcated by valve symbols) could matter, for example, m probablhty of out-mlgratmg or marrymg (see also Low 1989. Clarke and Low m press) These greatest-hkehhood pathways simply track, for all mdlvlduals born m the sample, the percentage at each comparison pomt who follow one or another fate This IS a visual representation, and the numbers dlmmlsh at each Juncture. so the percentages WIII not always suggest the results of the statIstIcal analysis (e g , a statlstlcal difference may be great, while the percentage IS small, or vice versa, because numbers are large or small) (A) A daughter born to a poorer father was more hkely than her richer cohorts to leave the parish before age 15, If she stayed, she was about equally likely to marry She was overwhelmmgly likely to marry a poorer husband Though her fertlhty could be great (33% had the median number of chddren for their decade of marriage and parish), her sons were hkely to leave the parish, and, If they stayed, to do poorly reproductively If she did not marry, there was an 86% chance she had fewer than the median number of children for all adults If she did not marry, there wa? a 48% chance she would have greater thdn or equal to the medtan number of children for all adults (0 Sons of poorer fathers were hkeher to leave the parish before age IS. compared to sons of richer father\ (1.5% versu\ 8%). for sons ot poorer men who stayed, there was an 89% chance they would be poor, and d 40% chance they would migrate out as adults Such men who stayed were hkely never to marry (57%). and (97%) have fewer than the median number of children compared to all adults D. Males born to richer fathers who were born to poor fathers and never married were far more hkely (86%) to have fewer than the median number of children born to all adult women Daughters born to rich men and never married nonetheless had a 48% chance of having greater than the median number of children, suggestmg that dlegltlmate birth\ occurred at higher rates among the rich (cf Low and Clarke 1991, who found lllegltlmacy rates from 2% to 7%)
B. Females born to richer fathers C. Males born to poorer fathers
In summary, women born to rich fathers were more hkely to survive to adulthood and stay m their parish of birth than were women born to poor fathers Whde all daughters staymg had about the same probablhty of marnage, their paths nonetheless diverged daughters of poor fathers married poor men, and daughters of the rich married rich men Fertlhty of unmarried women was related to father's status, daughters of poor men were likely to have fewer than the median number of children relative to all adults Males. (Fig 3c, d) Males born to poor fathers were 7% more hkely to migrate before age I5 than were sons of rich men (Fig 3c, d) As adults, sons of rich men were very hkely (91%) to become wealthy themselves, while sons of poor men were hkely to stay poor (89%) As adults, poor sons of rich men were 6% more hkely to migrate than poor sons of poor men (see Clarke and Low m press for a dlscusslon of the Influence of skdls and IIquldlty of resources on mlgratlon) Of men who stayed m their birth parish. probablhty of marrying varied with own and father's status Poor sons of poor fathers were most hkely to remam unmarried (57%). 97% of such poor. unmarried men had fewer than the median number of chddren Fertlhty comparisons for men were done m an analogous manner to those for women Rich sons of rich fathers had an approximately equal chance of marrymg or not (48% versus 52%), and once married had a 59% chance of havmg the median or greater number of chlldren Rich sons of rich fathers who did not marry were, hke poor sons of poor fathers, more hkely to have fewer than the median number of children Although 97% of poor sons had this fate. only 55% of rich sons did Two less hkely but mterestmg paths also occurred Most drdmatlcally, the few men (I I%) who were able to attam wealth even though born to a poor father had an 84% chance of marrying, and once marned, a 66% chance of havmg at least the median number of children On the other hand, poor sons of rich fathers did not fare as badly as the poor sons of poor father\ Poor sons of the rich stdl had a greater probablhty of marrymg (54% versus 460/o), and once married had a 74% chance of havmg at least the median number of children Perhaps these men benefited from theu-relatlonshlp wlthm a wealthy famdy m ways not measured by their occupatlonal status Thus, the mo\t hkely hfe-paths for men varied Sons born to poor fathers were most hkely to remam poor themselves, never to marry, and to have fewer than the median number of children Sons of rich men were most hkely to become rich themselves Their chances of marrying or not were about equal, If they married. they were hkely to have at least the median number of children, If they did not marry, they were hkely to have fewer than the median number Figure 3 In 19th-century Sweden, hfe-patterns of survtvorshtp, mtgratton, and fertthty were clearly related to resources, wealth, and status Over their hves, both daughters and sons of wealthier men were likely to have more children than daughters and sons of poorer men, as a result of mteractmg factors vartously related to wealth. survtvorshtp, hkehhood of becommg wealthy m turn, and women's age at marriage This pattern remained true throughout the 19th century, mcludmg periods commonly desrgnated as "demographtc transrtton " As Figure 3 shows, father's wealth IS certamly not all that matters some percentage of both sons and daughters of wealthier men fall to marry and have children The most dramatic pattern of children's lives with father's wealth IS that sons of poorer men, even m egahtartan 19th-century Sweden, had almost no chance of becomtng wealthy and havmg more than the median number of children (Fig. 3c ) Our results (also see Voland 1990 , Turke 1989 , 1990 , Low 1989 , 1990a suggest that, even m relatively modern ttmes, m Western soctettes whtch are monogamous and attempt to be egahtartan, wealth drfferenttals promote fertthty differentials When resources become constructed, (e g., Low 1989), famdy reproductrve dtfferenttals are hkely to drsappear Others also have found this generally to be true Indtvtdual patterns m such Important Items as age of marriage typtcally vary wtth resources (e g , Wall 1984 , Sharpe 1990 , Cam 1985 Mclnms 1977 , Ptister 1989a Thompson and Brttton 1980, Hayamr 1980; Schultz 1982 . Simon 1974 Dependmg on their own resource bases (e g , Galloway 1986, Schultz 19851, famthes may respond qmte dtfferently to such influences as market shifts. treat their children quote dtfferently (e.g , Mttterauer and Seeder 1982 I IO), even aggregate data tend to reflect resource Influences as mdtvtduals make dectstons (e g , Thomas 1941; Wrtgley 1983a,b) Why then do so many studtes of modern fertlhty fall to find these patterns7 We suggest several posstbthttes.
[ll Census data are not destgned to eluctdate mformatron about famrly lineages, but households It IS, for example, tmposstble to tell "own" chtldren, from stepchtldren, from other relatives hvmg m the household from nonrelatrves hvmg m the household When actual lineage data are exammed (e g , Mueller 1991), wealth and status are hkely to be correlated wtth fertthty for men even today [21 The existence of effective. cheap contraceptron IS bound to comphcate any relattonshtp between wealth and fertthty (though we note that (Turke and Betztg 1985) . status and wealth correlate wtth male reproducttve success In some tradtttonal soctettes, such as the Ache (Kaplan and Hdl 1985, Hut and Kaplan 1988) and the Yanomamo (Chagnon 1979 (Chagnon , 1982 (Chagnon . 1988 , few phystcal resources are owned; even here, status represents a resource In the Yanomamo, male km available for coahttons also represent a resource, and men mampulate kmshtp terms m ways that make more women avatlable for mates, and powerful men as coahtton partners (Chagnon 1979 (Chagnon , 1982 . so that reproducttve success IS uneven Among the Yanomamo, not only bemg a member of a numerous and therefore powerful km group works as a method of gammg waves, but also gammg recogmtton as a revenge-kdler (Chagnon 1988) In none of these cases was there a correlatton between chtldren's survtval and father's resources; the correlatton existed between wealth/status and number of wives, and waves with their chtldren were frequently relatively Independent economtc umts
Our results have the clear tmphcatton that fertility declmes, even today, are hkely to be local, and locally reverstble, rather than singular events wtth smgular causes The extent to whtch we can predtct fertthty shafts as a result of economtc condtttons or purchasing power wdl depend on a number of factors, but espectally how much parental investment asststs mdtvtdual chtldren. Perhaps the relattve costs and benefits of chtldren themselves are tnfluenttal (e g., Easterhn 1978 , Becker and Barro 1988 , Turke 1988 resource dtfferenttals, opportunmes for better-educated chtldren, and mtgratton opportumttes
As resources begm to decrease, the rusks of mtgratton will be percetved as less onerous, we expect mtgratton to Increase d tt can offer reproducttvely less successful mdtvtduals an alternattve Even the rrchest family's wealth could be dissipated through contmued even Investment m large numbers of chtldren, thus unequal Investment (even m the face of legal mandates for equal mherttance) are unsurprtsmgly common (e g , Hartung 1982 , Low 1990a . Low et al. 1991 ) When Increased Investment m mdrvtdual chtldren enhances then abthty to survtve, marry, and reproduce, net lineage success can be enhanced by shtftmg more resources mto Investment m children (educatton, savmgs, health msurance, resource gtfts, etc ); unless there IS a net Increase m total resources, the allocatton of avatlable resources must be mto fewer children (e.g , Rogers 1990, 1991) Thts IS true whether one constders cases m which Investment enhances survtvorshtp dtrectly. or cases such as those proposed by Tally (1978) m whtch survtvorshtp shifts are constdered to be exogenous Thts ecologtcal approach echoes some classtc demographtc models centered on "mdtvtdual dectston" and "proxtmate vartables" (e.g , Becker 1981. Becker and Lewts 1974 , Easterlm 1978 , Tdly 1978 . Bongaarts 1978 , 1982 , Lmdert 1978 , Stmon 1974 , Lesthaeghe and Wilson 1986 , as well as Mosk's (1983) "leveragmg" approach to fertthty, and Easterlm and Crtmmms' (Crtmmms and Easterlm 1984; Easterlm and Crtmmms 1985) models of the factors favormg a shaft to consctous control of fertthty. All of these with others hvlng with the famdy or leavmg early (behavloral ecologists would call this an "alternate strategies" sltuatlon) Couples at the high end of the socloeconomlc "ladder" might do better by mvestmg more per child to allow them to be competltlve with their peers (e g , education, clothing, status acqulsltlons) The required Investment may hmlt the number of chddren they can afford. Wlthm sub-groups, however, those with more than sufficient resources may be able to support addItIonal children and still have all be adequately Invested Measuring "resources" IS, of course, a difficult task. Important resources can differ slgmficantly between and wlthm regions These dlfferences result not only from physlcal differences m the environment, but also from the social structure of the population Here we have used a simple combmatlon of mformatlon about best status and landownership We have suggested that relatIonshIps between resources and reproductive patterns can be easdy clouded by aggregate data and Inadequate measures of total resources, and predlctlve analysis of populatton/envlronment mteractlons WIII depend on careful evaluation of varlatlon m both physlcal and social envu-onments
CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we suggest that resources posltlvely Influence hfetlme reproductlve success both through productlon of and Investment m chddren This relatlonshlp appears to hold, then, not only for tradltlonal socletles. but through the demographlc transrtlon ml9th-century Sweden External condltlons which Influence competltlveness Influence the relative potency of Investment versus productlon Perhaps a re-examlnatlon of exlstmg data m this broader, behavloral ecological, perspective would be useful For example, mdustrlahzatlon may not be, of Itself, a force drlvlng toward lower fertlhty. unless success m an lndustrlal envu-onment requires greater tralnmg or monetary Investment by parents, resulting In later marriage ages, and often, fewer chddren marrymg (e g , the "European" marriage pattern, HaJnal 1965) We also suggest that, If high fertlhty IS not a response to Infant loss (see Low et al 1991, Low 19911, medlcal Increases, we expect fertdrty to declme, and resources to be routed mto investment, decreasmg mortahty and mcreasmg success of children Thus, rather than "the" demographlc transition with a singular cause, we expect fertility trends with local, reversible, patterns In our data, as well m the work of others, we find that the primary components of populatlon change (fertility, mortahty, and mlgratlon) respond to ecological conditions at the mdlvldual family level m ways that are predlctable, and familiar to students of nonhuman populations In our 19th-century Swedish population, even during the demographic transrtlon, resources are posltlvely correlated with family size and lifetime reproductive success Resources make certain life-paths far more likely than others We need not postulate a conscious declslon on the actors' parts to predict these patterns True, our human consciousness offers us additional, perhaps less pamful, optlons for responding. but It does not entirely free us of the constraints and opportumtles which our environment provides Human complexity and conscious decision can (as many demographer\ and economists have subtly appreciated) add \peclal dlmenslons For Instance, we fmd that not Just the amount of resources held, but also the economic liquidity of those resources, may influence an mdlvldual'\ succes\ In a deteriorating environment, a farmer's land may be less easily converted than alternatlve resources held by the upper-and lower-middle cla\s Then land, usually a valuable resource, may limit mlgratlon options (Clarke and Low in press) In sum, we suggest that certain predlctable ecological rules underlie patterns of fertlhty, mortality. and mlgratlon, although these may be constrained by a variety of cultural complexities and mteractlon? For example, men's reproductive patterns vary m concert with resource control to a much greater extent than women's patterns, this variance between the sexes IS greatest when resources are abundant When resources become constncted, reproductive responses are uneven among families, and even wlthln famllles In a resource-constnctlon period, we might find very unequal investment In children within a famdy, with heightened Investment m older (closer to successful reproduction) sons (whose success we predict to be more dependent on resources than daughters) We have pubhshed these findings previously (Low 1989 , 1990a , 1991 , Low and Clarke 1991 m press, Low et al 1992 Our argument converges on several demographic models, It differs m maintammg that not prlmarlly financial, but genetic lineage (reproductive) returns have shaped patterns of human fertlhty Different predIctions arise, and can be tested, indeed, e g , Boone (19861, Turke (1989 , 1990 ), Borgerhoff Mulder (1988 ), Mueller (1991 ), Voland (1984 , 1989 , 1990 ), and Voland and Engel (1990 
